Although branchless banking systems have spread to different parts of the developing world, methods to ensure transactional security in these systems have seen slower adoption because of a variety of operational constraints. A basic requirement from such systems is the provision of secure and reliable receipts to users during transactions, and recent attacks have demonstrated that existing systems fall short of fulfilling this requirement in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and practical protocol to enable users to authenticate transaction receipts in branchless banking systems. Our protocol makes novel use of missed calls (sent from users to the bank) to help distinguish real receipts from spoofed ones and can be implemented on any mobile phone, without software installation. Besides preventing spoofing attacks, the protocol enjoys significant advantages of usability, efficiency and cost, which make it a more practical choice than other schemes. We also discuss ways to use missed calls to mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks on branchless banking systems.
INTRODUCTION
Branchless banking systems have become prevalent in the developing regions of the world as a carrier of financial services to the economically disadvantaged populations. Instead of setting up brick-and-mortar branches and ATM machines, these systems rely on distributed human agents to Technologically, though, these systems still stand on weak ground, lacking the kind of foundation that has been used to build other forms of electronic commerce. To reduce costs, service providers use purely mobile-based messaging to communicate with users during transactions and strive to ensure compliance with basic (non-programmable) phones, still widely present in the developing world. This, coupled with the need for high usability amongst poorly-educated users, throws up new security challenges, which are difficult to address via standard approaches. In response, providers tend to use ad-hoc security measures to protect parts of their systems and sometimes, leave parts completely unprotected.
In this paper, we focus on a key component of branchless banking systems which has been particularly difficult to secure because of the above constraints and which has also been the subject of attacks in multiple recent events. This component is the process of providing receipts to users at the end of transactions as a statement of transaction completion. Receipts are typically delivered to users over a cellular network via SMS on their personal phones and are a key indicator of a transaction having been recorded with the provider. In some systems, receipts are given to customers on printed paper using custom devices held by agents. In either mode, there is usually no way for the user to verify the validity of a receipt or to detect receipt forgery.
We propose a simple and practical protocol that enables users to verify the authenticity of receipts in branchless banking transactions. Our protocol makes novel use of missed calls 1 to help users distinguish genuine receipts from fake ones and is based on one simple insight: instead of having the user be a passive receiver of a receipt during transactions, require him to actively poll the service provider before the receipt is sent to him. We use missed calls for performing this polling, which not only minimizes bandwidth and the cost to the user, but also ensures high usability by our target audience. We propose numerous extensions and variations of our protocol, which achieve different levels of security-including security against certain types of man-inthe-middle attacks-with different associated usability and deployability tradeoffs. We also discuss ways to use missed calls to improve the reliability of receipts in existing systems.
Our protocol provides security against receipt spoofing attacks and we prove its security with respect to a variant of the security model proposed in [20] . The security offering is weaker than what can be achieved using cryptographic techniques but we believe that this limitation is more than offset by the other benefits the protocol offers. We highlight other techniques we have considered in solving the receipt authentication problem in branchless banking and argue why our technique is the most practical choice amongst these. Our protocol is currently being considered for deployment by a leading branchless banking provider in India named Eko [1] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present background and related work in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we give more information on Eko and the lessons we have learnt by observing Eko's operations in the field. These lessons have critically influeced some of our design choices, as we elaborate later. Section 4 presents our system model and Sect. 5 describes our basic protocol. Sections 6 and 7 present extensions of the protocol and Sect. 8 concludes the paper.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
With growing institutional emphasis on inculcating saving habits amongst the world's poor and recent criticisms of micro-credit [12] , branchless banking systems have become a powerful instrument for social transform in the developing world. Unlike micro-credit systems, these systems treat a savings account as the starting point for financial inclusion and are usually very tightly integrated with existing banking networks. They either provide savings as the primary product or enable operations on savings accounts (like remittances) for those who have difficult access to banks.
Transactions involve a human intermediary (the "agent") who is required to facilitate banking on behalf of the provider and is paid a nominal fee in return for his services. In most systems, the agent is a local community member, the owner of a mom-and-pop shop, who provides agent services to visiting customers from within his shop's premises. Some systems use agents who are mobile and make door-to-door visits to remote customers. Both models have their pros and cons. In this paper, we assume the first model although extending our results to the mobile agent model is easy.
In a typical transaction, a customer approaches an agent, and makes a request for a transaction which could either be a deposit, withdrawal or a money transfer. In the case of deposits and money transfers, the agent checks that the customer has the right amount of cash in hand and sends a transaction message to a central server using his mobile phone. The server validates the transaction request and responds with an SMS receipt to both the agent and the customer on their respective phones. (In some systems, the response is sent only to the agent and the latter prints out a physical receipt for the customer.) Once the receipt arrives, cash is transferred to the agent. The server maintains a virtual balance for the agent which is debited during deposits and replenished when the agent later submits the collected cash to the provider. Customers can also withdraw money from their accounts by visiting the same or different agent. Finally, there is an enrolment procedure which customers must go through in order to start using any of the services; this process is similar to, but less demanding than, what banks normally perform during account creation.
Risks
One could list several potential threats to branchless banking systems (as done in [20] ), but there are two which seem most relevant to practice. The first is an attack in which a malicious user tries to operate an account that he is not authorized to operate, e.g., by stealing the victim's phone. All known branchless banks implement a defense against this attack by requiring that (a) customers submit suitable credentials during withdrawals, and (b) agents do the same during deposits and money transfers. User credentials are protected from theft using different techniques, like programming the SIM card of users' phones [2] or using special security tokens to encipher PINs [1] . See [21] for a detailed discussion on this topic.
The second serious threat to branchless banking is the forgery of receipts that are given to users after every transaction. Fake receipts can cause users to yield cash even when a transaction has not been recorded by the provider. Receipt forgery is of greater concern in branchless banking than in traditional e-commerce because here, a receipt could symbolize an account credit for real cash that is given away to another user (and not necessarily a debit for goods purchased). Existing systems use plain SMS or paper for communicating receipts to users and spoofing such messages is easy, given recent technological advances 2 . It is this threat that forms the focus of the current work.
Related Work
Despite the widespread use of branchless banking services in practice, there is little academic literature on the security issues surrounding them. Recent work from the systems community discusses the challenges associated with security design for branchless banking [19, 20] , but unlike the domain of ATM-based banking and credit card commerce, no systematic standards of security have yet evolved.
Kumar et al. [15] present an ethnographic study on cashbased payment practices in India and based on this study, provide guidelines for designing mobile payment systems for developing countries. While their study brings out the potential value digital receipts can bring to monetary exchanges in developing countries, there is no discussion on security of receipts, which is where our contribution lies.
The threat of spoofing is encountered in several electronic applications and there is a rich set of techniques used to prevent it. In web-based commerce, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, underlying the ubiquitous HTTPS protocol, is used to provide protection from spoofing and forgery and it relies on cryptographic message authentication codes (MACs) for this purpose [8] . A similar approach is used by the widely-deployed SSH and IPSec protocols [25, 13] . In the domain of Internet routing, the S-BGP protocol and its variants use digital signatures to prevent spoofing of route announcement messages [14] . In general, cryptographic approaches like these provide the best defense against spoofing but they are difficult to apply in the realm of branchless banking because of the limited programmability of client devices in this setting. (See Sect. 6.1 for more.)
Non-cryptographic approaches to prevent spoofing have also been explored in the past, particularly in the domain of wireless networking. Two popular techniques are the use of received signal strength (RSS) to detect spoofers [7] and that of "jamming" an adversary's transmissions with supporting hardware [16, 11] . These techniques are designed specifically for short-range wireless networks and detect spoofing at the physical layer of the network; in contrast, our interest is in application-layer security for cellular networks. We also hope to avoid the use of additional hardware (besides one phone per user), as is necessitated by some of these techniques.
The idea of using missed calls for security purposes has some real-world precedents. Numerous services in the developing world today use missed calls to authenticate claimed possession of phones in commercial transactions; see, for example, [3, 4] . However, the security objectives these services address are different from ours: there, the goal is to authenticate the source of the missed call whereas in our work, it is to authenticate the destination (or rather, that a given message originated from a given destination). We do discuss the former problem as well in the paper, and clarify further differences with prior work in Sect. 5.2.
SETTING THE CONTEXT: EKO
This section lays down the context in which our research is anchored. We describe current practices at a prominent branchless banking provider in India called Eko and some of the lessons we have learnt by observing their operations.
Eko is a business correspondent of State Bank of India (SBI), the leading public sector bank of India, and also of two private banks-ICICI Bank and Yes Bank. It has been operating in India since 2007 and at the time of this writing, serves over 1.5 million customers, through nearly 2000 agents, in eight Indian states. The main service offered by Eko is money transfer using which a customer can submit cash (upto a limit) at an agent outlet and have an equivalent amount of money credited in a bank account anywhere in India, for a fee of roughly 1%. The target accounts may be regular bank accounts or those created using a branchless service like Eko, and the electronic transfer time ranges from a few minutes (in the case of SBI) to 1 day (in the case of the private banks). The service is targeted at low-income migrant workers in urban India who regularly need to send money to their rural relatives but are unable to obtain a personal bank account (due to domicile requirements) in order to accomplish this. There are indications that over 100 million people of this type live in the country [23] . Such people, who would earlier either rely on expensive methods like the post office to send money, or spend numerous hours standing in queues at bank branches, now use branchless banking services like Eko to meet their needs. The actual protocol for money transfer involves mobile messaging between the agent and an Eko-operated server in which the agent first submits transaction details and her credentials to the server either using a protocol called USSD 3 or, in the case of some newer agents, via a mobile app residing on an Android phone. After running suitable checks on the transaction message, the server responds with a transaction receipt indicating a debit in her effective balance at Eko and also sends a receipt, in the form of SMS, to the transacting customer as shown in figure 1 . The receipt begins with the phrase "Deposit successful" following which transaction details like the amount transferred, the target account number, the fees deducted for the transaction, agent phone number, a transaction identifier (TID) and a timestamp are included. Fields are named in English, which is not the first language for most customers, but easier to implement in SMS. Customers are required to provide cash to the agent after receiving and verifying the details of the transaction receipt. First-time transacters must register themselves using an enrolment protocol which also involves mobile message exchange of a type similar to that in the money transfer and sometimes, even a KYC (know-your-customer) verification.
Eko reports a daily transaction volume of more than Rs.50 million ($1 million) 4 in its money transfer offering. Typical money transfers fall in the range of Rs.2000 to Rs.5000 ($40-$100) and an agent may receive upto 200 customers on a single day. Daily cash collections can thus easily run into thousands of dollars on a per agent basis and agents may make multiple visits to nearby bank branches everyday to offload cash and restore electronic balances. It is common for customers to remit almost their entire monthly incomes in a single Eko transaction, leaving themselves the bare minimum for local consumption.
Besides money transfers, Eko also provides a facility to open "mini" savings accounts with SBI, targeted at people who cannot afford regular savings accounts at banks. Such accounts are easier to create but can be transacted only at Eko outlets; transaction volumes and frequency are also restricted for them. Customers can deposit money into these accounts using a protocol similar to the money transfer pro-tocol, check their balance, withdraw money and even transfer money into other mini savings accounts. Receipts are similar to the ones delivered during money transfers. Although this service pre-dates the money transfer service, its current utilization is much smaller ($10,000 daily transaction volume); as such, we focus on money transfers for the rest of the paper.
Lessons from the Field
Between 2011 and 2012, we, along with other researchers, made multiple visits to Eko agent shops in Delhi (where Eko is headquartered) and interacted with their technology staff multiple times. Some of the outcomes of these visits are documented in [22] ; below, we highlight our lessons from these interactions which are most relevant to this paper.
• Our main finding is that a majority of Eko customers value SMS receipts tremendously and perceive them as a true indicator of a transaction record. We have observed several instances of customers expressing anxiety over non-arrival of SMSes. A few customers report to prefer Eko over other branchless banking services in Delhi because Eko's system incorporates SMS receipts whereas others don't (and instead use paper).
• Customers are largely unaware about the possibility of SMSes being spoofable, although a small minority (two customers in a sample of more than 50) do express distrust towards the SMS medium. Once informed about the possibility of spoofing, customers generally express interest in using an improved system but not at the cost of convenience. Some customers that we spoke to strongly opposed the use of additional devices (other than their phone) to verify the validity of SMS receipts.
• Most customers of Eko either possess feature phones or dumb phones, which is not surprising given the mobile phone landscape in developing countries [6] . Less than half of the customers we have met in the field report to have phones with Internet capabilities. Eko expresses reluctance to deploy solutions that require software installation on customer phones, although agent phones are increasingly becoming smarter.
• Even though the electronic money transfer could be instant, the conversion from electronic money to cash at the recipient's end (a withdrawal at a bank branch or Eko service point) is staggered. Based on customer reports, it appears that the typical withdrawal window is 2 days, although it is possible for recipients to take a week in the process, because of limited access to banking services in rural areas. Thus, it could be long before users of the system verify whether the money transfer has happened or not and must end up relying on the received SMS and the agent's word temporarily.
• Delays in SMS are a common problem that both agents and customers report. While Eko does provide a help line for resolving grievances, very few customers directly call the helpline in situations of SMS delays. In fact, a few customers are not even aware about the existence of the helpline, even though information about it is displayed on posters in all agent shops. Ostensibly, agents do not inform all customers about the helpline facility since it is not a necessary component of the transaction workflow.
Known Attacks
We know of two events in which Eko agents have used fake receipts to deceive customers during transactions. Both events had a similar pattern: a customer would approach an agent, hand over cash, and the agent would provide a hand-written paper receipt to the customer, claiming that the SMS receipt would arrive on the customer's phone later when the "server is available". No messages were ever sent on the network and much of the cash was eventually lost to the agents. Although in these events the agents did not use electronic spoofers to defraud customers, the incidents do reveal the possibility of malicious intent amongst agents and highlight the importance of building tools to enable customers to verify transaction fulfillment (and to do this instantly and reliably). Eko has stepped up its customer education and agent monitoring efforts in response to these events and is also seeking ways to prevent spoofing of SMS receipts.
Elsewhere in the world, SMS spoofing has already been used to attack branchless banking systems. M-Pesa [2] , the first branchless banking service in the world and one with a customer base of over 10 million across 4 countries (at the time of this writing), was subjected to spoofing attacks in which malicious customers used fake SMS receipts to steal money from agents. The attack proceeded as follows: a customer approached an agent, requested a withdrawal and, as is customary in withdrawals, initiated the transaction by sending a message from his mobile phone. The message was sent to an accomplice on the network instead of the real M-Pesa server, the target recipient for genuine transactions. The accomplice instantly forged an SMS receipt for the transaction, tagged it with a genuine-looking sender ID and sent it to the agent's phone, claiming a record of the transaction on the actual server. The agent, not being able to tell the SMS apart from genuine receipt messages, was persuaded into yielding the cash to the customer. About $450-which is more than ten times the average M-Pesa transaction value-was lost.
There are reports that multiple instances of this attack were launched against M-Pesa agents [9] . No fixes to the system are publicly known.
While we do not know of such spoofing attacks having been launched by agents in money transfer or deposit transactions, the threat is potent and of concern to providers like Eko. Given the sensitive nature of the issue, it is plausible that such attacks have already taken place but have gone unreported. The limited negotiating power of the customers of money transfer transactions (relative to agents) also raises the possibility that agent fraud remains under wraps.
SYSTEM MODEL
Before we present our protocol, we need a security definition. To define our objective, we build upon the system model for branchless banking developed by us in [20] , adapting it to money transfer transactions. There are 3 entities in any branchless banking system-the bank B, the customer C and the agent A. Customers and agents are together referred to as users. The "bank" abstracts all the back-end processes involved in branchless banking transactions-those implemented by correspondents like Eko and those by the actual bank they are linked to.
There are two types of branchless banking protocols of our interest-a money transfer protocol and an enrolment protocol associated with a money transfer. We model these based on the way they are implemented in Eko. Besides these two protocols, customers can also conduct deposit and withdrawal protocols. Our security solution can be adapted for deposits and withdrawals, and we omit the details here.
We assume both customers and agents to have a personal, connected mobile phone during transactions. Not all branchless banking systems require customers to possess phones (e.g., those that issue paper receipts don't) but this assumption is critical for our security objective. For simplicity, we assume a one-to-one mapping between users and phones; our results can be generalized to accommodate arbitrary userphone mappings, under reasonable assumptions.
Enrolment. An enrolment protocol involves the following steps. A customer C approaches an agent A and submits his phone number I(C) and a bank account number J (D) associated with another entity D, with whom C intends to transact in the future. If the enrolment is successful, C is provided an identifier, λC,D, which is to be used in the actual money transfer; the bank B maintains a database T1 and adds a record (λC,D, I(C), J (D), t) to it, t being the time of recording the data. If the enrolment fails (e.g., if D could not be identified), C reports failure. In real systems like Eko, λC,D is a concise representation of C and D's identities, which makes repeated money transfers from C to D efficient.
Money Transfer. The actual money transfer has the following template: C approaches an agent A with the intent of transferring money to D, submits the value of λC,D and communicates the amount of money x to be transferred. A verifies that C possesses the claimed money (by counting the cash held by C) failing which A does not proceed. On successful verification, A, B and C run a 3-way protocol using their respective phones, at the end of which both C and A either report success or failure. C submits cash to A if and only if he reports success. The bank maintains a database T2 which stores details of all money transfers. For every new money transfer from C to D via agent A observed by the bank at time t, it assigns an identifier i to the transaction and updates T2 with a record (i, I(C), I(A), J (D), x, t). It also decreases the effective balance bal(A) of agent A by x.
Threat Model
We consider a threat model in which the adversary can either corrupt protocol participants (and make them behave maliciously) or transmit spoofed messages on behalf of arbitrary entities. In particular, our focus is on a scenario in which agents behave maliciously and attempt to disrupt the protocol by sending spoofed messages to honest customers. For money transfer transactions, this is the most natural threat to consider, given our earlier discussion.
Besides spoofing, we also allow the adversary the power to acquire honest users' phones and tamper with them (e.g., a malicious agent stealing an honest customer's phone), although an honest user whose phone is compromised by the adversary is assumed to be aware of such a compromise. This rules out scenarios in which, say, a malicious agent replaces the SIM card of an honest customer's phone, without the customer learning about it.
For most of the paper, we do not consider man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks; e.g., a malicious agent is not allowed to intercept mobile communication between an honest customer and the bank and tamper with such communication "in transit". MITM attacks, though interesting, are difficult and expensive to mount on cellular networks especially when compared with SMS and call spoofing. For example, setting up a fake base station to intercept voice calls or SMSes requires an investment upward of $1500 and a good amount of engineering skill [24] , whereas spoofing is possible essentially for free. Section 6 provides further discussion on this topic.
Security Goal
Our security objective is to ensure authenticated communication in money transfer transactions. For any money transfer protocol involving an honest customer C, we want two conditions to hold:
• Soundness: If C reports a successful transfer worth x to D, then the bank must record a fresh entry (i, I(C), I(A), J (D), x, t) in T2, for some i, t and I(A).
• Completeness: If the bank records a fresh entry (i, I(C), I(A), J (D), x, t) in T2 for some i, t and I(A), then C must report a successful money transfer worth x to D.
Our primary concern is the first condition (soundness), which implies that customers are protected from spoofed messages during money transfers. The second condition (completeness) protects the bank from recording transactions in which the claimed sender of a money transfer is unaware of the transaction. We say that a protocol is sound (resp. complete) with respect to customers if for every honest customer C, it satisfies the soundness (resp. completeness) condition.
Security goals like these can be defined from the perspective of agents as well: soundness means that for every successful transfer reported by an honest agent A, the bank records a corresponding entry in its database; completeness means that for every new entry in the database (involving honest agent A), A reports success with respect to the corresponding transaction. A secure protocol is one which is sound and complete with respect to both customers and agents. 
THE PROTOCOL
For our protocol description, we assume that agents possess programmable phones and that there is a secure channel between the bank and every agent phone which provides application-layer authenticated communication. This can be achieved using standard cryptographic techniques. We also assume that agents use suitable credentials like passwords to authenticate themselves to the bank and the secure channel ensures credential privacy. Several branchless banking services (including Eko) are beginning to use programmable phones for agents and those for which this assumption does not hold, our protocol can be adapted to provide authenticated communication from bank to agent (and techniques like [21] can be used for privacy). As such, we focus on securing bank-customer communication in the rest of the paper. 5 Like [20] , we do not consider privacy of transactional data as a security goal. Though interesting in its right, this is a goal orthogonal to authentication and seems difficult to address using the techniques developed in this paper.
We assume this communication happens using mechanisms like SMS, USSD or voice calls, which do not inherently provide authenticity guarantees.
One final assumption we make is that the bank B possesses a phone number I(B) which is either publicly known and trusted or else can be securely communicated to every customer either before or during enrolment. This is analogous to assuming a trusted public key of a central provider in cryptographic solutions to authentication, except that here the information to be trusted is a simple phone number.
The Basic Protocol
At its heart, our authentication technique is quite simple. When a customer C conducts a money transfer protocol involving the agent A and the bank, he expects a notification from the bank about the success or failure of the transaction. Suppose he receives a message (as an SMS or a paper receipt) which gives him this notification-how does C verify that the message is genuine and not spoofed? Our solution is the following: C sends an empty message to the bank over the mobile network, and if the bank knows that it sent a message to C, it re-sends the same message back to him electronically. However, if the bank did not send a message to C in the first place, it sends a failure message in response to C's message. The failure message indicates a spoof attempt (or, more generally, that no transaction was recorded in the bank's database) and if C receives such a message, he aborts the transaction.
The above idea can be used to build a protocol which is sound with respect to customers. There is one small catch, though. What if C, being a human, forgets to send the empty message he is expected to send? One option would be to make this step an optional component of the protocol i.e., even if the bank does not receive a message from C within a time bound, it continues with the protocol and sends a success notification to both users. While this would lead to a more convenient UI for customers, the resulting protocol would not be sound and could be easily defeated by malicious agents. We, thus, make the empty message an integral part of the protocol, requiring the bank to abort transactions if it is not received (within a pre-set time limit).
The empty message could be implemented in multiple ways, and an obvious choice is that of a missed call. Missed calls have known usability advantages over SMS and are usually more economical from the users' standpoint. The missed call functionality is also more ubiquitous on mobile phones than some equally usable alternatives like USSD. We thus use missed calls to instantiate the empty message in our descriptions below.
Formal Description
Enrolment. We describe the enrolment protocol first, as it would take place between a customer C, agent A and the bank B. First, C submits (I(C), J (D)) to A and A forwards this information to B over the secure channel connecting the two entities. When B receives such a message from A, it verifies the validity of J (D) and sends an acknowledgement message ok1 to A. When A gets such a message from B, she tells C to call B whereupon, C sends a missed call-denoted beep-to B at B's trusted phone number I(B). receives the missed call, it generates the identifier λC,D and sends it to C while sending the final confirmation ok2 to A.
A formal description is depicted in figure 2 . We use send(I, m) to denote the process of sending the message m to destination I and rcv(I, m) that of receiving m from I. The latter is treated as a boolean which returns true for a successful receive event. For A and C, the sending and receiving implicitly happens on their respective phones. The construct "When X, do Y " is to be interpreted as "Wait until X is true and if X is true, do Y ". (A timeout on the waiting process is assumed.) We use X ← Y to denote assignment of Y to X; here, X and Y could be scalars or vectors. In B's code, the term "J is valid" (step 2) abstracts all processes involved in verifying the validity of J including checking that the account number exists, is enabled for money transfers and has not already been registered by C in a previous enrolment attempt. Also, generate(λ, I, J ) (step 4) abstracts a process of generating an identifier λ which guarantees that for every customer phone number I, the identifier is unique per recipient account number J .
The missed call sent from C to B prevents the spoofing of the identifier λC,D. We implement an upper bound on the amount of time that the bank waits for the missed call from C which is denoted τ in the figure (step 6). Note that just sending λC,D from B to C is not enough; to ensure authenticity of λC,D both λC,D and J (D) must be communicated A: 1. When C submits (λ, I, y) , Verify C has y in cash. If not, stop. send(I(B), (λ, I, y)) 2. When rcv(I(B), ok), tell C: "Call B" 3. When rcv (I(B), (ok, λ, I, y) ), report success.
Else, report failure.
Else, send(I, fail) C is required to retain the map from λC,D to D for future protocols which, in Eko, is done on small paper cards that are given during enrolment. Note that the bank sends a failure message to C if C sends a missed call at a time when none is being expected from him (step 5).
Money Transfer. The money transfer protocol is depicted in figure 3 . The workflow is very similar to the enrolment protocol except that here, the transaction confirmation sent to C is protected from spoofing. In B's code, the function transfer(y, A, J ) (step 4) denotes the process of crediting account J with y and deducting y from bal(A). The output is a unique transaction identifier generated during this process. Note that in the beginning of the protocol, we require C to submit only λC,D (not J (D)) to A and the message he receives from B later on, also contains λC,D only. This is sufficient given that the earlier enrolment protocol guarantees authentic receipt of λC,D. Also note that B sends only one message to C during the entire protocol (and not two, as discussed in the beginning of the section). Thus, in J (D) are masked (by replacing with an 'X'). While this gives some privacy to J (D), it actually makes the protocol insecure even without the use of mobile message spoofing. We have discussed this problem and its fix with Eko.
the communication efficiency of the protocol is the same as that of money transfers in Eko's current system, modulo the beep sent by C. (This is true for enrolments as well.) The beep introduces very little overhead from an efficiency and cost perspective. Finally, note that C receives a failure message not only for an unmatched beep (step 5) but also for forgetting to send a beep when required (step 6). 
Security
Our main security claim is the following.
Proposition 5.1. The basic protocol (depicted in figures 2 and 3) is sound with respect to customers.
A proof of this proposition appears in the full version of the paper. We remark that our proof relies on the assumption that the communication between customers and the bank is reliable and in particular, that the failure message sent from the bank (step 5) always reaches its intended destination and does so instantaneously. In practice, this can be ensured by using a suitable combination of voice calls and SMS to instantiate the message (e.g., transmit one copy in a voice call, one in an SMS) instead of relying only on SMS. Additionally, the voice call could involve a human operator to improve reliability over an automated solution. Since failure events are likely to be infrequent in practice, such an implementation should not raise costs significantly.
Our basic protocol is sound, but it is not complete, since the bank does not have a way to verify whether missed calls sent by C are genuine or spoofed 8 . We address the issue of completeness next.
Achieving Completeness
For completeness to hold, the bank must be able to authenticate the customer during transactions. While authenticating customers is less important for money transfers than for withdrawals, it is still useful to satisfy this property to maintain customer traceability. A natural approach for this is to assign passwords to customers which they would securely communicate to the bank during money transfers instead of sending a plain missed call. Given our constraints, this is difficult to achieve in a foolproof manner while still maintaining usability. Below, we discuss two extensions to the basic protocol which achieve completeness in restricted threat models and still maintain some of its usability benefits.
Our first solution emulates the use of passwords. The bank reserves a set S of N phone numbers which act as its proxies for receiving missed calls. When customer C enrolls for money transfer for the first time, the bank selects a number I uniformly at random from S and assigns it to C. The bank includes I in the message sent to C and C stores it secretly (e.g., in a private phonebook). For all future transactions, when C is required to send a missed call to B, C dials I and not I(B). B checks that every beep from C comes via the proxy assigned to him and when otherwise, ignores it 9 . This naturally reduces the probability of an attacker spoofing missed calls for C by a multiplicative factor of N . The downside is that it does not work against eavesdropping adversaries; once C's secret phone number is leaked, a spoofer can fake missed calls on his behalf.
The second solution provides better guarantee against eavesdropping by assigning secret phone numbers dynamically to customers, much like one-time passwords. There are two instantiations: one in which the secret phone number for a transaction is communicated during the same transaction and one in which it is sent in the previous transaction. In the first one, C sends two missed calls to B instead of one in every transaction-the first call is made to I(B), in response to which B sends a randomly generated number Ij from S to C. In the second missed call, C calls Ij. Only if both missed calls are received by the bank is the transaction deemed successful. A spoofer can only make the first call successfully since he cannot receive Ij without eavesdropping or stealing C's phone. Unlike the first solution, here, even if the secret number for one transaction is lost, other transactions done by the same customer remain secure. An approach similar to this is used for customer verification in [4, 3] , except that there the secret number is sent via a secure web channel.
The second instantiation saves bandwidth over the first one by piggy-backing secret phone numbers with transaction receipt messages. Here, C makes two missed calls for the first enrolment it executes and subsequent to that, the transaction receipt for the jth transaction executed by C (and sent in step 4 of the bank's code) contains a random number Ij to be used for missed calling in the (j + 1)th transaction. While this solution increases communication efficiency, it offers a poorer UI because the customer must store Ij till the (j + 1)th transaction is over.
We remark that for completeness to hold, we require every customer to communicate the loss of his phone-when this happens-to the bank and the bank to block transactions involving such phones. In practice, we expect completeness to be less of a concern in money transfer transactions than soundness because the incentive to fake a customer in these transactions is limited. For example, an agent A who fakes a customer to the bank must still suffer a deduction in her effective balance bal(A) for the transfer she reports. (In contrast, her incentive to not report the transaction itself and break soundness is high.) As such, moderate solutions like the ones above should provide sufficient security.
Addressing Missed Call Flooding
Our protocol provides greater transactional security to systems like Eko but it also introduces new possibilities of denial of service, which must be suitably addressed. First, there is the possibility of the bank's phone number being jammed with calls from a malicious caller, which may cause the number to become unavailable to honest callers. A safe- 9 An alternative implementation would be to have the bank assign a secret password I to C during enrolment and require C to call I(B) and provide I to authenticate. We prefer the above form due to its greater usability (fewer inputs required from the customer during transactions).
guard for jamming would be to have the bank support a large number of parallel channels on the same phone line and to disconnect incoming calls the moment they are registered, thus making each call extremely short-lived. Even with this safeguard, jamming is difficult to prevent completely without operator support.
Besides jamming, there is the possibility of an attacker spamming the bank with spoofed missed calls and causing the bank to respond to them wastefully. Recall that in our protocol, if the bank receives a missed call from a source I and there is no pending transaction associated with I, it responds with a failure message. This feature is essential for ensuring protocol soundness but when used by an attacker to send repeated spoofed calls, it could lead to a backscatter of failure messages to innocent targets. We list down some safeguards that could be implemented to resist such attacks.
Segregation. First, the missed call destination phone numbers for enrolment and for money transfers should be kept separate. Detecting spoof attempts during money transfers is easier than during enrolment, as we discuss below.
Filtering during money transfers. During money transfers, the bank can apply a variety of authentication techniques to detect missed-call spoofing. A first-cut technique would be caller ID filtering-the bank maintains a list of genuine callers (viz. all customer phone numbers which were used during successful enrolments) and a call from a source outside this list should be discarded. This will defeat an attacker who is generating spoofed caller IDs at random. Further filtering can be performed using the authentication solutions presented in Sect. 5.2. Finally, instead of maintaining one fixed phone number for missed-calling, the bank can maintain a pool of numbers which is partitioned based on agent geography: a customer with phone number I(C) must send missed calls to the number I assigned to the agents in his geography and if a missed call from I(C) is received at a destination other than I, it should be treated as a spoof. Phone numbers assigned to a geography must be publicized using out-of-band approaches. In our field interactions, we have found strong locality in agent selection by customers and customers tend to interact at most 2 agents in their proximity.
Filtering during enrolment. Filtering out spoofed missed calls during enrolments is harder because the bank does not have enough information to authenticate the first missed call made by a customer. Even simple caller ID filtering cannot be easily performed at this stage. One approach that would work in practice is to have customers communicate their phone numbers to the bank using out-of-band methods (e.g., by making a phone call to a human-operated system) which may be difficult for a spoofer to execute in an automated manner. Other approaches would involve increasing the level of trust in agents (e.g., having the customer misscall using the agent's phone, followed by a missed call from his own phone) and could be used when the DoS threat is perceived as being more severe than that of malicious agents.
MITM ATTACKS
Our protocol from the previous section does not provide security against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attackers: such attackers can divert missed calls from customers away from the bank and respond with spoofed messages. Still, the missed-call approach could be extended to foil MITM attacks of a certain kind which seem most relevant to practice. In this section, we propose a technique to accomplish this. The technique works only for money transfers, and not for deposits and withdrawals. We consider MITM attacks mounted on the air interface by the use of fake base stations like the IMSI catchers devised by BlackHat researchers [24] . We make 3 assumptions:
• In any money transfer, the recipient D is distant from the sender C and owns a personal phone. This is reasonable given that money transfer recipients own bank accounts, which usually implies possession of a phone.
• The adversary uses fake base stations to mount MITM attacks. MITM attacks of other types require access into operator networks, which is normally difficult.
• The adversary mounts MITM attacks one location at a time; multiple simultaneous fake base stations at different locations in the network are ruled out.
Our proposal is the following: when C executes a money transfer to D via agent A (or enrolls D via agent A), both C and D are required to send a missed call to the bank. Only if the bank receives missed calls from both users will it proceed with the transaction and send success notifications to all users (including D). In all other events, the transaction would be aborted and users informed suitably. A missed call from either C or D that does not follow a request for money transfer from C to D will be treated as an indicator of a spoof attempt and the caller informed accordingly. The order in which C and D send the missed call is less important; that they send one each and that both verify that the response is not fail is key.
This approach can be used to build a modified protocol that is provably secure against MITM attacks under the assumptions listed above. (We omit details for lack of space.) Although the approach involves synchronization between the money-sender and the recipient, the incremental effort required for ensuring this is small-in our field visits at Eko, we have found that a phone conversation between the two users is common practice during money transfers and from D's perspective, making a missed call is a bearable overhead given the usual eagerness to receive money. Also, the modification for handling MITM attacks is compatible with other protocol modifications discussed in Sects. 5.2 and 5.3, although a combination of all the techniques may lead to a noticeable drop in usability. In particular, enrolling new money transfer recipients will require verification of both the money-sender and the recipient's phone numbers.
Cryptographic Solutions
There is a variety of cryptographic tools one could use to guarantee security against MITM attacks and not just of the specific kind discussed above. We have considered these approaches and found that all of them are fraught with deployment challenges. First, we cannot easily assume that customer phones in these systems are universally programmable and as discussed in Sect. 3, dumb phones continue to be used by customers of Eko. Second, programming SIMs of customers with cryptographic programs may provide some level of security but it cannot be implemented without the co-operation of mobile operators. In Eko, the customer base uses phone services from at least 7 different operators! There is a third possibility which has been less studied, in theory and in practice, which is that of using human-assisted signature schemes. Even if a customer's phone cannot verify digital signatures for him in software, it may be possible for the customer to do the verification himself, using his own computing abilities. The idea of human-verifiable and cryptographically-secure signatures is not new and different approaches have been proposed in past work. A classic approach is to use random functions: give the user a list of secret random functions f1, f2, . . . over the message space and for the ith transaction message m, send m and fi(m); the latter serves as a signature on m. It is well-known that random functions make provably-secure MACs [10] and conceivably they can be implemented in a human-computable manner, albeit with bulky keys. Another approach (based on the classic idea of secret sharing), is that of visual authentication [18] . In this approach, the user is provided a transparency with random images imprinted and the signature of a message m is computed as an image fi(m) in such a manner that "overlaying" the transparency on fi(m) produces a visual depiction of m. Visual authentication is plausibly more usable than the use of random functions, although it requires the transmission of graphical data, which may be difficult on dumb phones. Paper receipts would be needed to carry visual signatures.
While these are all interesting approaches to explore from a theoretical perspective, their biggest failing is the associated lack of usability. Any approach to human-assisted signatures must require the user to either carry additional devices or remember long keys (or both) for otherwise provable security against MITM attacks would be unachievable. Second, such an approach must require cognitive work from the user at the time of transactions. These usability barriers are made more acute by the limited education of our target audience, who will require careful training in understanding, maintaining and using secret keys. We believe that from a practical perspective, it makes most sense to make the security objective slightly modest (e.g., aim for security against specific types of MITM attacks, as discussed earlier) in favor of making schemes more usable by the developing-world audience. We currently don't know of any real incidents of MITM attacks in branchless banking and even in web-based commerce, the incidence of MITM attacks is rare.
RECEIPT RELIABILITY
Although the use of missed calls in our protocol is motivated by security reasons, it seems possible to extend this use for improving reliability of receipt messages in current systems. We propose a simple technique for this. The idea is to enable customers to make multiple missed calls during a single transaction and to have the bank re-transmit the computed receipt message for each missed call received by it from the same customer. Varying the method for re-transmission can increase the probability of successful delivery. For example, the bank could tier its responses as follows: for the first n1 missed calls from the customer, respond with an SMS; for the next n2 missed calls, respond with a voice call and for the (n1 + n2 + 1)th missed call have a human operator call back the customer. Based on our early conversations with network managers of a leading operator in India, our understanding is that congestion on the SMS channel tends to occur independently of congestion on the voice channel (being caused usually by SMSC overload) and that SMS re-transmissions alone could increase message arrival rates in some networks. Thus, we believe that our technique is likely to increase the overall reliability of receipts for successful transactions. It would be interesting to evaluate the effectiveness of re-transmissions on message delivery rates in a real network-and through the evaluation, converge on suitable values for n1, n2 for our technique-but we leave this problem open for future work.
We remark that introducing the possibility of multiple missedcalling in our protocols must be done with care for this could affect security adversely e.g., it could increase the chances of abusive calling by customers or lead to security gaps during back-to-back transactions. Additional safeguards will be needed to retain security if this facility is implemented.
CONCLUSION
Receipt authentication is a fundamental security issue in branchless banking systems and recent events have demonstrated that there is sufficient incentive amongst attackers to disrupt systems which leave receipts unauthenticated. The unique constraints of the developing world have made cryptographic solutions to authentication-widely used in other forms of electronic commerce-difficult to use in addressing this issue. In this paper, we presented one solution that uses the simple concept of missed calls to protect branchless banking systems from receipt spoofing attacks and also satisfies the deployability constraints surrounding them. Our protocol is easy to use, cheap to implement and bandwidthfriendly and it achieves provable security against an important class of attacks which have affected real systems. The protocol can also be generalized to provide security against stronger (MITM) attacks and, potentially, to increase reliability of mobile-based receipts as well.
In ongoing work, we are collaborating with Eko on deploying our protocol as part of their current architecture. Independent of this paper, Eko had piloted a slightly different protocol which also requires customers to make missed calls during transactions. (See the full version of the paper for details.) Although the protocol used by Eko is neither sound nor complete, results from the pilot indicate that a missed call is an overhead customers are willing to bear during transactions. Eko currently plans to discontinue that protocol and deploy the basic protocol from Sect. 5.1 instead. Together with them, we plan to test some of the extensions to the basic protocol with real users and study the associated performance and usability issues.
Going forward, our biggest challenge is not technology but ensuring that technology gets used the way it is prescribed to be used. Our belief is that shielding branchless banking systems from agent fraud requires a combination of secure technology, customer education and careful agent selection and management and this paper addresses only the first ingredient of the three. We hope to work with Eko to ensure that some of the other ingredients are also put in place.
